The signing key, published on its own.

Every Evidence Link checkpoint is signed with an Ed25519 key. A Case File carries a copy of the public key so its checkpoint can be checked, but a careful verifier should not trust a key that arrived inside the same package it is meant to validate. This page is the out-of-band source: obtain the key here, independently, and compare it with the one in any bundle.

Current checkpoint signing key

Key ID	`bbda9aca0e2e5589`
Status	Active · signs all current checkpoints
Algorithm	Ed25519
Fingerprint (SHA-256 of the DER encoded public key)	`bbda9aca0e2e55899261cd8ebbf234bd8a8989e12e3922f809ccba0f186e0e1c`
Raw key	signing-key.pem

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MCowBQYDK2VwAyEA9uPRvLBYEjiWzgtdrngZ9n9Clf7LZQLBKnbMQAYouuU=
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

The Key ID is the first 16 characters of the fingerprint, so the ID itself commits to the key. Reproduce the fingerprint with: openssl pkey -pubin -in signing-key.pem -outform DER | sha256sum

How to use it

Every checkpoint names the Key ID that signed it. A checkpoint signed by a key that is not published here should not be trusted.
When you verify a Case File, compare the public key inside the bundle with this page. Matching fingerprint, independent source: the circular trust problem is closed.
The offline verifier already validates checkpoint signatures against the bundle's key. This page is how you validate the key itself.

Rotation

Keys rotate deliberately, never silently. When a new signing key is introduced it is published here before it signs its first checkpoint, and retired keys stay listed permanently with their Key IDs and fingerprints, so historical Case Files remain verifiable against the key that actually signed them. The Bitcoin timestamp anchors on checkpoints do not depend on this key and are unaffected by rotation.